Post-non-classical philosophy: postmodern “deconstruction” and rational reconstruction of the history of science
Liberal Arts in Russia. 2020. Vol. 9. No. 1. Pp. 16-23.Get the full text (Russian)Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
The article analyzes the issues of the methodology of post-non-classical philosophy. The author focuses on the postmodern “deconstruction” and the rational reconstruction of the history of science. The author seeks to identify the similarities and differences between these methodologies. Postmodernist “deconstruction” represents the basic methodology of postmodernism, designed to “eliminate” the classical philosophical context. In general, “deconstruction” is irrational and negative. Rational reconstruction of the history of science is used in the field of philosophy and methodology of science to build concepts for the development of science. The main goal in this case is the discovery and justification of the basic laws in the development of science. The methodology of counterexamples and the methodology of implicit knowledge, applied to the history of mathematics as additional methods, make it possible to clarify mathematical proofs and theorems, as well as to obtain an increase in mathematical knowledge based on the explication of hidden lemmas. The author substantiates that the “methodology of implicit knowledge” has obvious advantages, because unlike the “methodology of counterexamples” it allows preserving and strengthening the deductive status of mathematics. The main findings of the article are summarized in the Conclusion.
- • post-non-classical methodology
- • “totalitarian” discourse
- • classical philosophical context
- • the problem of truth
- • philosophical rationalism
- • dialectical materialism
- • rational reconstruction of the history of mathematics
- • growth of scientific knowledge
- • mathematical quasi-empiricism
- • deductivism
- • implicit knowledge
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